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Abstract
Since the euro area crisis, there has been an intense discussion about the potential side effects  
of ECB policy on reform efforts of euro area countries. This discussion is set to become even more 
intense in the wake of the corona crisis and the ECB’s forceful intervention. Opponents of expan-
sionary monetary policy contend that it reduces reforms, whereas proponents argue that it spurs 
reforms. We test these arguments empirically by studying the effect of monetary policy shocks  
on structural reform adoption in the euro area. Using an event study approach, we find that  
surprise monetary expansions causally increase the likelihood of structural reforms significantly:  
For the period between 2006 and 2016, a monetary surprise expansion of 25 basis points by the 
ECB increased on average countries’ reform rate by roughly 20 percentage points after two years. 
This effect is stronger for countries with weaker macroeconomic fundamentals or tighter public  
budget constraints. The findings are consistent with the ‘room-for-manoeuver hypothesis’ that 
expansionary monetary policy spurs competition-friendly supply-side policy by reducing the short-
run costs of reforms and increasing governments’ financial leeway. More research will be required 
to establish whether the results are applicable in a post-corona economic environment.
Key words:  
Macroeconomic policy, euro area, event study, panel data.
JEL classification:  
C23, E52, E58, P11.
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1 Introduction
Structural reforms comprise policies that improve the institutional and regulatory frame-
work of an economy in which firms, households, and governments operate. They increase 
countries’ competitiveness and resilience to shocks, and enhance employment prospects. 
Following the global financial and the European sovereign debt crises as well as many  
years of low (productivity) growth, the calls for such reforms in Europe were loud prior to 
the outbreak of corona. The need is particularly evident in the euro area, where labor and 
product markets are highly regulated and growth is disappointing despite aggressive easing 
by the European Central Bank (ECB). 
This concurrence spurred an intense debate on the efficacy and potential side effects  
of ECB (un)conventional policy. Unconventional policies included forward guidance,  
credit easing and quantitative easing, among others. On the one hand, it is argued that 
expansionary monetary policy reduces reform pressure on slowly growing and indebted 
countries because it improves their financial market access and lowers public financing 
costs. The opposite view contends that monetary easing enables reforms as it increases 
governments’ leeway to finance them. Expansionary policy may also spur demand, which 
attenuates the transitory costs of reforms, making them more likely. In this study, we 
address the following question: does expansionary monetary policy increase or decrease  
the reform rate in the euro area?
The main challenge in estimating the effects of monetary policy is causal identification. 
While the stance of monetary policy might affect the decision of governments to undertake 
reforms, it also depends on broader economic conditions, which themselves are a function 
of reforms. To address confounding factors of this type, we use an event study design and 
extract the unexpected variation in euro area interest rates on ECB policy announcement 
days. Our main structural reform measure is the reform responsiveness rate of the OECD. 
This indicator captures the implemented structural reforms as a share of recommended 
reforms by country in the OECD’s yearly Going for Growth reports. It is a comprehensive 
metric of legislative and regulatory changes across a large number of markets and sectors.
We find that expansionary monetary policy shocks increase the reform rate. The effect is 
significant, both statistically and economically. The baseline specification suggests that 
a monetary surprise expansion of 25 basis points increases the reform rate by roughly 
20 percentage points over two years. We then go into detail by studying potential trans-
mission channels underlying this link and investigate whether monetary policy affects 
reform adoption differently across countries. The results indicate that monetary easing is 
more effective in the euro area periphery and in countries that participated in a financial 
assistance program than in core and non-program countries. Moreover, it shows stronger 
reform-inducing effects in countries with weaker macroeconomic fundamentals and more  
fragile public finances. These findings are consistent with the view that expansionary  
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monetary policy spurs structural reforms by attenuating their short-term costs and by 
increasing governments’ room for maneuver. 
The study presents a novel stylized fact, which contributes to the policy discussion in 
Europe: expansionary monetary policy appears to increase structural reform adoption.  
As there is a widespread consensus that reforms increase countries’ growth potential,  
stability, and resilience to shocks, a clear understanding of how central banks’ decisions 
affect reform adoption may help in designing an adequate policy mix after deep recessions. 
These findings have taken on a new importance in light of the corona crisis, which has led 
to an even steeper economic recession than following the global financial and economic 
crisis and the ensuing euro area crisis.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the main  
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the regression 
results. Section 5 contains a sensitivity analysis, before Section 6 concludes.
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2 Hypotheses
While an extensive literature studies either the drivers of structural reforms or the effects 
of monetary policy, the direct link between both has not yet been subject to a thorough 
analysis. Two opposing views coexist in the discussion, either considering expansionary  
monetary policy as reform catalyst or, in contrast, as reform hindrance. The arguments 
parallel those in the ‘crisis induces reform’ debate (Drazen and Grilli, 1993), but are largely 
verbal. Some countries traditionally reform more, while others engage in fewer reforms on 
average. The question is therefore whether ECB policy affects the decision to reform. 
On the one hand, expansionary monetary policy may reduce reform pressure by easing  
market access of indebted countries. According to this view, the ECB’s accommodative 
stance has two main effects on reform activity. First, the bond buying programs improve 
governments’ financing conditions (GCEE, 2016). This can reduce incentives to increase 
the efficiency of public spending and tax systems or to lower subsidies. An implicit guar-
antee by the ECB against a speculative run on public debt could also lead to moral hazard 
in the form of further risk-taking as governments expect to be bailed out, which reduces 
incentives to stabilize debt. A second potential effect is that sovereign bond yields no longer 
function as a signal of the soundness of public finances and may deviate from fundamen-
tals (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013). This makes signal extraction more difficult and  
can mask inefficient tax systems and public sectors. A related strand of argument holds 
that expansionary monetary policy would, for instance, incentivize evergreen loans by 
banks that help otherwise failing firms (‘zombie firms’) to survive (Banerjee and Hofmann, 
2018). This would prevent resources from being allocated to more productive firms and 
thus would dampen overall productivity growth in the economy, a prime objective of  
structural policy. In the remainder of the article, we refer to these arguments as the  
‘moral-hazard hypothesis’.  
On the other hand, expansionary policy could also increase efforts for (structural) reforms. 
Gordon (1996), Angelopoulos et al. (2013) and Draghi (2015) among others suggest that 
monetary policy easing, boosting demand and prices, can attenuate the transitional costs  
of reforms. Another main channel is that lower policy rates stimulate job creation and 
reduce public financing costs. This increases governments’ financial leeway to lower pub-
lic sector distortions as it facilitates negotiations with political interest groups and labor 
unions that might otherwise oppose reforms. For example, a reduction in job protection  
or unemployment benefits could be coupled with more active labor market policies or  
subsidies for new hires. Leeway of this type could also enable governments to focus on 
those structural reforms that are conducive to bank health and reforming insolvency 
frameworks – both of which are remedies to the above mentioned zombie firm phenom-
enon (McGowan et al., 2018). The relaxation of the public budget constraint also allows for 
compensating the subset of the population most adversely affected by reforms. Henceforth, 
we refer to these arguments as the ‘room-for-maneuver hypothesis’.
10
The Impact of Monetary Policy on Structural Reforms in the Euro Area
3 Empirical strategy
In this section, we first describe the data and in particular the measure of structural reform 
activity used. We also outline how we circumvent potential endogeneity to identify mone-
tary policy shocks. Specifically, our identification strategy consists of two steps: First, we 
isolate the exogenous component of monetary policy using an event study approach. Then 
we evaluate the effects of the monetary surprises on reform implementation in a set of 
panel regressions. In the final part of this section, we outline the empirical model. 
3.1 Measuring structural reform activity: Policy priorities
We use the reform responsiveness rate (RRR), an index created by the OECD, to gauge the 
impact of monetary policy on structural reform activity. Its construction is based on policy  
priorities recommended in the OECD’s Going for Growth reports. The scoring system of  
the RRR seeks to assess the extent to which countries have implemented policy recommen-
dations outlined in previous reports (OECD, various issues). For each member country, five 
policy priorities are determined based on their ability to improve long-term material living 
standards through either higher labor productivity or enhanced labor utilization.
The reference performance criterion for policy priorities is the level of GDP per capita, 
given its broad coverage. It allows for ranking each country and for determining in how  
far differences in living standards can be attributed to gaps in either productivity or labor 
utilization. At least three of the five priorities are based on internationally comparable 
OECD policy indicators, which have been linked empirically to aspects of economic perfor-
mance. The additional two priorities are determined using a combination of indicators and 
country-specific expertise. They ensure that important policy imperatives in non-indica-
tor-based areas are not disregarded. 
As depicted in Figure 1 on the next page, the country-specific policy priorities are derived 
from a combination of both quantitative and qualitative assessments.1 In a first step, the  
Going for Growth framework determines a country’s specific areas of relative strength  
and weakness in labor utilization and productivity. The most recent version of the reports 
also includes inclusiveness. This is achieved by juxtaposing each performance measure with 
a correspond ing policy indicator. The link between outcome and indicator is established 
based on empirical research. For instance, for the productivity branch of the framework, 
total factor productivity (a performance measure) is linked to market entry barriers (policy  
indicator). In the labor utilization branch of the Going for Growth framework, aggregate 
employment (performance measure) is matched with the labor tax wedge (a policy indica-
1 For a more detailed description of the RRR, see OECD (various issues) and the supplementary information in 
the appendix. 
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tor). Whenever both the policy and performance indicator lie well below the OECD average, 
a potential priority candidate is identified. Following this quantitative assessment, country  
experts at the OECD use a qualitative analysis to weigh the different potential priorities 
against each other, accounting for country-specific challenges, circumstances and social 
preferences. The final policy priorities are chosen based on their estimated impact on GDP 
per capita, on the distance of the policy stance from the OECD average and on recent devel-
opments in policy and outcomes (OECD, 2012). The relative emphasis put on productivity  
and labor utilization in the selection of the five priorities varies across countries and is 
established using the country specialists’ expertise. 
Descriptive statistics for the reform responsiveness rate
Table 4 in the appendix displays the evolution of Going for Growth recommendations across 
different policy areas. The distribution of priorities is relatively stable over time. Produc-
tivity-enhancing priorities have gained some importance and now make up two thirds of 
overall priorities. Within these, human capital as well as product market regulation, trade 
and foreign direct investment account for the lion’s share. In the case of employment- 
enhancing policies, social benefits and active labor market policies obtain most weight. 
The reform responsiveness rates are determined by the share of adopted measures from  
the given recommendations for each country: Whenever the OECD formulates a reform  
recommendation in a given priority area for a specific country, it is assessed in the follow-
ing year whether “significant” action has been taken. An action is considered significant 
if the associated reform tackles the underlying recommendation and if it has been put into 
legislation and/or implemented. In contrast, reforms that do not go beyond the stage of 
pure announcements or government plans are disregarded (OECD, 2019).
The RRR is then calculated based on a scoring system, which assigns a value of one for 
each possible reform recommendation if significant action is taken – and zero otherwise. 
FIGURE 1: OECD model for setting Going for Growth reform priorities 
5 priorities
Outcomes
(e. g. aggregate 
employment)
Outcomes
(e. g. total factor 
productivity)
Outcomes
(e. g. gender gaps)
Policies
(e. g. labor 
 tax wedge)
Policies
(e. g. administrative 
burdens)
Policies
(e. g. childcare)
Productivity InclusivenessLabor utilization
Quantitative assessment
Qualitative assessment (country desks)
Source: OECD, Going for Growth, 2017.	
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As a given policy priority may entail several reform recommendations, the overall scoring 
is often based on more than one reform opportunity per policy priority area. For instance, 
product market priorities can cover economy-wide barriers, such as excessive administra-
tive burdens, but may also be restricted to industry-specific barriers, for example, in the 
electricity market (OCED, 2017). 
Our sample for the RRR comprises all euro area countries (except Cyprus, Lithuania and 
Malta) for the years 2006 to 2016. We linearly interpolate some missing values. Table 5 in  
the appendix shows a considerable variation in the reform rate across countries and years.  
It ranges between zero and 0.917, with mean of 0.329 and standard deviation of 0.185. The 
mean implies that countries implement 32.9 percent of the recommended reforms on average.
Relaxations in employment protection legislation and in unemployment benefits explain 
reform patterns particularly well, especially in the euro area periphery. Specifically, 
Greece followed Going for Growth recommendations for the most part from 2010 up to 
2012 and relaxed job protection of white-collar workers by reducing the notice period 
prior to dismissal. Moreover, probationary periods and temporary work agency contracts 
were extended and minimum labor costs for young workers between 18 and 25 years and 
apprentices were reduced. Ireland improved work incentives for women, strengthened 
labor market activation policies and reduced unemployment benefits in both 2010 and 2011. 
Italy undertook a comprehensive labor market reform in 2013, which relaxed employment 
protection rules and increased the flexibility for job dismissals. Similarly, Portugal reduced 
employment protection legislation for regular contracts and tackled disincentives to work 
by lowering the ceiling to unemployment insurance. In the same vein, the Slovak Republic 
eased legislation on regular contracts by shortening the length of the notice period prior  
to dismissal. Spain addressed labor market duality and lowered employment protection 
legislation. Moreover, wages were made more responsive to firm-specific conditions and 
the retirement age was raised. 
In addition, periphery countries deregulated product markets via privatizations in the 
energy, postal and transport sectors. Pension, public sector and welfare reforms aimed  
at a fiscal consolidation. Early and tertiary education were improved (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain), tax bases were broadened (Greece, Ireland, Portugal), 
infrastructure was strengthened (Ireland), bankruptcy and financial market supervision 
was reformed (Ireland, Italy) and distortions in the housing market were removed (Ireland, 
Slovak Republic, Spain).
Reform efforts in Europe’s core countries vary less over time. Reforms mainly target  
work incentives by reducing disincentives to work at older ages (Austria, Belgium, Finland,  
France, Germany and Luxembourg). Furthermore, the tax wedge on labor income was 
reduced (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany), administrative burdens and regu-
latory barriers to competition were lowered (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands), and early and tertiary education were improved (Austria, Finland, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg).
Advantages and limitations of the reform responsiveness rate
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the RRR as measure of reform efforts 
in an empirical analysis of reform drivers. There are three reasons for this. First, while  
data for other OECD or IMF indicators can easily be extracted from the respective web 
pages, there is no publically available dataset for the RRR. The data need to be collected 
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from the Going for Growth reports. Using this measure thus constitutes an innovation to 
previous studies. Second, the RRR was first introduced in 2010, which precludes the use of 
this measure in any prior research. Third, a large part of the literature is concerned either 
with the evaluation of the effects of reforms on growth (Campos and Horváth, 2012; Égert 
and Gal, 2016) or with specific types of reforms (Abiad and Mody, 2005; Campos and Cori-
celli, 2012; Angelopoulos et al., 2013). Due to the limited time span covered by the RRR and 
the aggregation of different reform types, the RRR is less suited to address such questions.
For our purposes, the RRR provides advantages over the alternative measures. First, it 
includes many types of reforms, whereas the other OECD and IMF indicators only cover 
labor and product market regulation. Hence it provides a more comprehensive picture  
of overall reform activity. Moreover, it considers legislative action as reform and, thus, 
captures early stages of reform adoption. It reacts faster to new information than the other 
regulation indicators. Given the limited number of years in the sample, this is desirable 
because it reduces the required number of lags in the empirical model. Furthermore, the 
responsiveness rate contains more variation within our sample, while the alternative OECD 
indicators change, if at all, only marginally over time.
A drawback of the reform responsiveness rate as an aggregate index is that it does not  
differentiate between reform areas. Moreover, it does not weigh the importance of each 
individual reform nor does it account for the difficulty to undertake reforms in certain 
areas, which makes it an imperfect measure of reform intensity. Reforms are easier to 
implement if they entail mainly benefits and few or no short-term costs, such as labor  
tax cuts, increased spending on active labor market policies or support to innovation.  
In contrast, reforms are more difficult when they hurt the short-term interests of specific 
groups, for example farmers in the area of agricultural policy, incumbent investors when  
it comes to boost competition, or if they are associated with job losses (OECD, 2010).  
A country suffering from weaknesses in labor market policies may thus appear less  
responsive to policy recommendations than one with priorities in easier-to-reform areas.2
Another caveat is that the responsiveness rate may overstate actual reform activity as it 
disregards reform reversals at later points in time. This is partly compensated by the fact 
that the rate captures only the year in which legislative action is taken rather than the 
years when legislation becomes effective. Whenever reforms are implemented over several 
years, only the decision year is considered as reform year in the coding, resulting in a slight 
understatement of overall reform activity. 
On the other hand, mere reform announcements are not coded as legislated or imple-
mented. This might understate reform activity if these announcements are credible, but 
implementation takes a long time. In addition, the Going for Growth framework focuses  
on a specific set of reform areas, namely those identified as priorities. Yet structural reform 
intensity could be focused on areas outside these priorities, which implies that the frame-
work does not measure every structural reform activity. In spite of the potential caveats, 
the RRR provides a well-suited cross-country framework of structural reform activity for 
our analysis.
2 To address this problem, a “corrected” version of the RRR is occasionally provided by the OECD. This  
measure weighs each country’s reform responsiveness in a given priority area according to the difficulty  
to undertake reforms in that area. The difficulty is measured by the inverse of average responsiveness to  
priorities in this area across OECD member countries (OECD, 2013). Due to data limitations, we cannot use 
the weighted RRR as our main measure. For the years and euro area countries for which we possess data on 
this variable, the correlation with the RRR is 0.94.
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3.2 Identification of monetary policy shocks
The main challenge in estimating the impact of monetary interventions on structural 
reforms is the isolation of exogenous variation in monetary policy. Endogeneity can result 
from both reverse causality and omitted variables that both correlate with monetary  
policy shocks and affect structural reforms. Regarding the former, Eggertsson et al. (2014) 
and Cacciatore et al. (2016) show theoretically that structural reforms trigger a response 
of monetary policy because they affect inflation and output. Regarding omitted variables, 
the literature on the drivers of structural reforms shows the importance of the state of the 
economy for reform adoption. Similarly, monetary policy responds to economic conditions. 
At the same time, it is difficult to control for this inherently unobservable variable. 
To address both sources of endogeneity, we rely on an event study approach. This method-
ology uses high frequency data to test whether monetary policy interventions affect asset 
prices (Kuttner, 2001; Gürkaynak et al., 2005). The intervention is measured as the change 
in a financial indicator related to monetary policy within a small time window around  
a policy event. The main idea is that closely before the event, the policy indicator incor-
porates the expected endogenous response of monetary policy to economic conditions. 
Consequently, any change in the policy variable from before to after the event is considered 
as reflecting the surprise component of monetary policy revealed by the announcement. 
The time window is chosen to capture most of the indicator response to a policy decision 
while preventing irrelevant information from affecting it. 
In normal times, the short-term interest rate is the main policy instrument of central 
banks. Therefore, event studies for these periods typically employ financial market prices 
closely related to this variable as policy indicator. In an US sample where the zero lower 
bound plays only a marginal role, Gertler and Karadi (2015) use surprises in the futures 
price for the federal funds rate in three months. Thereby, they also capture forward  
guidance shocks by the Federal Reserve. We closely follow their approach for the period  
of conventional ECB policy.
However, the extraction of unconventional ECB surprises raises additional challenges. First, 
at the zero lower bound short-term rates provide insufficient variation. Therefore, we use 
interest rates for maturities of two years and longer. Second, short-term risk-free policy 
indicators might not reflect important ECB credit easing policies. Hence, we employ sover-
eign yields, which reflect sovereign credit and liquidity risk. Finally, whereas US financial 
markets are highly integrated, euro area markets were fragmented when some of the most 
important ECB unconventional tools were announced. We thus employ a panel approach 
across countries to extract the average change in sovereign yields on announcement days.
We extract the variation in the phase-specific policy indicators using the following panel 
model for the daily frequency: 
χ i,j,t = αi + β χ i,j,t – 1 +  
A
Σ
a =1
γaDa, t + 
N
Σ
n =1
δnzn,t + εi,j,t  (1)
where χ i,j,t is a phase-specific dependent variable, i denotes countries, j maturities and t 
days. ai are country-specific constants and Da, t is a dummy variable taking value one, if  
monetary policy announcement a  = 1, …, A took place at day t and zero otherwise. zn,t  
controls for the release of macroeconomic news on variable n = 1, …, N. We include news on 
136 macro economic data series for the euro area as a whole, as well as for France, Germany, 
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Italy, Spain, the UK and the US to attenuate the risk that the one-day window covers  
information unrelated to the monetary policy announcements. For each series, we compute 
the difference between the first release and the expected value. The latter is the median of  
a panel of experts surveyed by Bloomberg.
For the period of conventional monetary policy, we drop the country index i from (1)  
and extract the common unexpected change in the next-to-maturity, 2nd and 5th three-
month Euribor futures rate. We consider policy events between January 2000 and July 
2007. For the period of unconventional policy, we use sovereign bond yields with a matu-
rity of 2, 5 and 10 years for all euro area countries for which data are available. We consider 
announcements between August 2007 and December 2016. They are listed in the appendix 
in Table 6.
Starting from August 2007, ECB engaged in a variety of non-standard policies. At the 
beginning, monetary policy was mostly directed towards reducing sovereign spreads of  
crisis-hit countries relative to non-crisis countries. The measures included large-scale 
liquidity provision to banks, interventions in stressed sovereign debt markets through  
outright purchases, and the institutional arrangements for Outright Monetary Trans-
actions. In 2014 the ECB first set negative deposit rates, prepared markets for the  
subsequent large scale asset purchase programs, and increasingly relied on forward  
guidance. These policies were aimed at stimulating the economy by lowering the risk-free 
yield curve.
Table 7 in the appendix contains a description of all variables that we use in the analysis. 
Finally, as we have a long time-series dimension of the data (more than 4000 daily obser-
vations), the Nickell-bias that potentially arises in fixed effects estimations with lagged 
endogenous variables is of no concern. At the same time, the lagged endogenous variable, 
given the high persistence of yields, essentially turns equation (1) into a model in first  
differences, so that we do not include a time trend in addition to the drift-like country- 
specific constant.
The coefficients of interest are those denoted with γa . They capture the variation in interest 
rates due to ECB announcement a. We transform the two vectors (γ1 ,…, γA)’ corresponding  
to conventional and unconventional policy into two daily series taking value γa  on the day  
of announcement a and zero otherwise. Subsequently, we aggregate both series into two 
yearly series by summing within years, where announcements taking place earlier in the 
year are given more weight than those taking place later, following the weighting scheme 
of Gertler and Karadi (2015). This is because an announcement in January has more time  
to affect variables measured at the yearly frequency than one in December. The frequency  
relation of our setup, which aggregates data from a one-day window to a year with 200 work- 
ing days, is only about half of theirs, which aggregates 30 minute surprises to a month 
containing 200 trading hours.
For the baseline regressions, we merge both yearly series into one measure of contraction-
ary monetary policy shocks to increase the number of observations. The results are robust  
to using unconventional policy, unweighted shocks and country-specific shocks. The latter  
are based on a panel model (across maturities) for the sovereign yields of each country 
sepa rately. Figure 2 on the next page shows the baseline weighted shock series. Table 5 in 
the appendix contains summary statistics. The common shock series varies between -30 and 
+25 basis points per year, fluctuates around zero and has a standard deviation of 14 basis 
points. As pointed out by Ramey (2016), the weighting introduces some autocorrelation. 
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3.3 Regression models 
To assess the effects of the monetary policy shocks on structural reforms and other  
macroeconomic variables, we use the following panel regression for the annual frequency:
Δy i,t = αi +  
J
Σ
j =1
βj MPi,t – j +  
K
Σ
k =0
x’i,t – k γk + εi,t (2)
 
where variables are indexed by both country i and year t. The change in a generic variable,  
Δy i,t  is regressed on an intercept, the monetary policy shocks MPi,t – j  and a vector of  
control variables x’i,t – k, which comprises potential economic and political factors relevant  
to reforms as emphasized in the literature. For the baseline model, the dependent variable  
is the change in the reform responsiveness and the monetary shocks are common across 
countries. The coefficients of interest are denoted by βj . They capture the dynamic response 
of reforms to monetary policy shocks. We set J = K = 1 in most regressions, but the results 
are similar when using more lags or when including a time trend.
Due to the non-stationarity of most time series that we use, the dependent variables  
enter (2) in first differences. With regard to the reform responsiveness rate, country- 
specific augmented Dickey-Fuller and panel unit root tests allowing for unbalanced  
panels do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Using first differences also controls 
for past reform efforts. Moreover, a White test for heteroskedasticity rejects the assump-
tion of homoskedasticity and, as the differenced data still contain considerable persistence 
according to their autocorrelation functions, we estimate model (2) with feasible general-
ized least squares. We account for heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation in the 
error terms, which produces consistent and more efficient estimates than ordinary least 
squares.
FIGURE 2: Monetary policy shocks in the euro area, 2000 – 2016
–0.4
–0.3
–0.2
–0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Notes: The figure shows the baseline weighted monetary policy shock series in percent,  
averaged across all euro area countries. Sample period: 2000 – 2016. 
Source: Bloomberg.	
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4 Regression analysis of monetary 
policy and structural reforms
Before we present the main results, we conduct a preliminary analysis to assess the  
plausibility of our monetary policy shocks. We check whether they produce macroeconomic 
effects consistent with standard theory and empirical evidence. Table 8 in the appendix  
reports the estimation of model (2) with the dependent variable being the change in log 
real GDP, log consumer prices and the unemployment rate, respectively. The monetary 
shocks reduce output, lower consumer prices and increase the unemployment rate. Most  
of the coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant. They suggest 
that a surprise monetary contraction of 100 basis points leads to a fall in GDP by 2.5 percent 
and in consumer prices by 1 percent as well as to an overall increase in the unemployment 
rate by 2 percentage points.
While these estimates are larger than those documented with classical SVAR analysis 
(Christiano et al., 1999), they are of similar size as estimates based on the single equation  
approach that we follow. Romer and Romer (2004), for example, find price effects of more 
than 4 percent. Coibion (2012) documents an increase in the unemployment rate of 1 per-
centage point. Furthermore, he shows that differences to the classical approach are due 
to differences in shock scaling, sample and lag length selection. Overall, the results of 
the preliminary regressions indicate that the identified monetary policy shocks have the 
expected effects on the macro-economy. 
4.1 Estimating the impact of monetary shocks on structural reforms
Table 1 on the next page displays the main results, based on the full common shock series. 
Column 1 suggests a significant decline in structural reform activity in response to a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock. The contemporaneous effect is individually significant. 
More importantly, the joint significance with its first lag, which is shown in the last row of 
the table, indicates that the null hypothesis that monetary policy has no effect is rejected at 
the 5 percent level.
Column 2 adds country fixed effects to the model. This specification reinforces the first 
impression. The current effect remains statistically significant and constant in size, and the 
coefficient on the lagged monetary policy shock becomes individually significant as well. 
Moreover, their joint significance increases to the 1 percent level. The Chi-squared statis-
tic of the regression increases strongly. The fixed effects raise the explanatory power of 
the model and, by lowering the residual variance, decrease the individual standard errors. 
The estimated effects are economically relevant. Column 2 suggests that a contractionary 
monetary shock of 25 basis points lowers the reform responsiveness rate by cumulatively 
20 percentage points after two years. 
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TABLE 1: Effects of monetary policy shocks on reform activity in the euro area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: change in reform responsiveness rate
Monetary shock, t  – 0.33 **  – 0.33 ***  – 0.33 ***  – 0.42 ***  – 0.47 ***  – 0.37 **  – 0.38 ***  – 0.52 ***
 (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.18)
Monetary shock, t-1  – 0.23  – 0.46 ***  – 0.51 ***  – 0.54 ***  – 0.52 ***  – 0.46 ***  – 0.46 ***  – 0.20
 (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.20)
Crisis dummy, t  0.02  – 0.01  0.00  – 0.02  – 0.02  – 0.02  – 0.04  – 0.07 **
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)
Crisis dummy, t-1  – 0.07 **  – 0.09 ***  – 0.09 ***  – 0.13 ***  – 0.14 ***  – 0.12 ***  – 0.12 ***  – 0.17 ***
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)
Output gap, t  0.01 **  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Output gap, t-1  – 0.01 *  – 0.00  – 0.01  – 0.01 *  – 0.01 **  0.00
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Struct. balance, t  0.02 ***  0.03 ***  0.03 ***  0.03 ***  0.02 *
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Struct. balance, t-1  – 0.03 ***  – 0.03 ***  – 0.03 ***  – 0.03 ***  – 0.06 ***
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Unemployment, t  0.01  0.01  0.00  – 0.01
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)
Unemployment, t-1  – 0.02 **  – 0.01  – 0.01  – 0.00
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Gov. debt, t  0.00  0.00  – 0.00
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Gov. debt, t-1  – 0.00 **  – 0.00 **  0.00
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Program, t  0.09  0.09 *
 (0.06)  (0.06)
Program, t-1  0.04  0.07
 (0.06)  (0.05)
Fiscal space, t  – 0.27
 (0.56)
Fiscal space, t-1  0.21
 (0.49)
Country effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Observations  136  136  136  136  136  136  136  95
Chi2 of regression  13.50  383.77  402.12  668.75  229.43  279.49  337.76  159.07
p-value joint test  0.015  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.002  0.014
Notes: FGLS with standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1. All models contain an unre-
ported intercept. A reform is an increase in the indicator. Sample period: 2006–2016, yearly observations. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The 
p-value at the bottom of the table refers to a test for joint significance of the monetary shocks.
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We augment the baseline model step by step by further explanatory variables (all in t  
and t-1) to test whether the results hold. We focus on economic control variables. A further 
sensitivity analysis shows that the results are robust to adding political reform drivers.  
In Column 3, we correct for the output gap to see whether the impact of monetary policy  
runs mainly through aggregate demand. Golinelli and Rovelli (2013) find higher reform 
activity when employment and growth increases. In Column 4, we add the structural  
budget balance to control for fiscal stimulus, which might affect reform efforts similarly  
as monetary policy by stimulating demand and giving breathing space to potential reform 
losers (Duval, 2008; Duval and Furceri, 2018). In both columns, the impact of monetary 
policy shocks remains highly significant and similar in size compared to Column 2.
In Columns 5 to 8, we extend the model with alternative measures of the business cycle  
and the state of public finances. We add the unemployment rate, government debt-to-GDP, 
a program dummy indicating whether countries receive aid from an IMF/ESM program and 
a measure of fiscal space. There is some evidence that more dire economic times reduce 
reform efforts, in particular when looking at the lagged impact of the additional variables. 
This corroborates the notion that more budget-constrained governments have greater dif-
ficulty to reform (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). The current values of the controls need 
to be treated with caution as the point estimates might be affected by endogeneity. 
Figure 3 below shows the dynamic effect of a contractionary monetary policy shock on the 
reform responsiveness rate. It is based on Column 2 but adds two more lags of the shock 
to the model. The reform rate falls gradually. It reaches a trough in the third year, before 
leveling out after four years. The cumulative response is highly statistically significant 
according to the 99 percent asymptotic confidence bands. 
FIGURE 3: Response of reform responsiveness rate to monetary policy shock
–2.0
–1.5
–1.0
–0.5
0.0
0.5
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Notes: The figure shows the cumulative effect of a +100 basis points monetary policy shock on the reform responsiveness rate  
in the euro area. The solid line refers to the point estimate and the shaded area to the 99 percent confidence bands. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.	
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Overall, the findings show a statistically significant effect of monetary policy on structural 
reform activity. The impact is also economically relevant. The earlier example of a 25 basis 
points shock is equivalent to 1.8 standard deviations of the shock series, so it is a reasonable  
shock size. The point estimates change only modestly across columns in Table 1. The  
stability in the coefficients is reassuring, as it suggests that the identified monetary shocks 
are not spuriously correlated with other variables. We conclude that unexpected monetary 
easing stimulates reform implementation, which supports the room-for-maneuver hypoth-
esis. 
4.2 Transmission channels and country heterogeneity
In this section, we investigate potential transmission channels of monetary policy shocks 
on reform activity. For this purpose, we include a number of interaction terms in the 
empirical model. They introduce cross-sectional variation in the effects of monetary  
policy and thereby sharpen identification as countries and governments might be more or 
less affected by monetary policy depending on their macroeconomic or financial situation. 
Specifically, we employ the following model: 
Δ Reformi,t = αi +Σ1j = 0 βj MPt – j +β3 Di,t – 1 + β4 MPt–1 Di,t–1 + +Σ
1
k =0 x’i,t – kγk + εi,t’ (3)  
where the interaction variable Di,t – 1 is one of the following: a periphery or program 
dummy, the unemployment rate, government debt, fiscal space, the output gap and infla-
tion. We lag the interaction variable and term by one year to allow for delays in the trans-
mission of these factors to reform activity and to reduce endogeneity concerns. The set of 
controls, x’i,t – k,  contains the crisis dummy, the output gap and the structural balance.
Table 2 on the next page contains the results. Column 1 distinguishes the effects between 
euro area core and peripheral countries. The significantly negative coefficient on the periph-
ery dummy suggests that these countries adopt on average 12 percentage points fewer 
reforms in the sample than countries of the core, irrespective of the ECB’s policy stance. This 
can reflect multiple factors. For example, while peripheral countries mostly have been grow-
ing faster before the crisis, they are growing slower and have more strained public finances 
in our sample, which is dominated by the European crisis, giving them less room for reforms. 
Moreover, these countries might have undertaken more structural reforms in the first place 
to join the monetary union. Banerji et al. (2017) show that labor and product market reforms 
are more effective when they are accompanied with fiscal accommodation and mitigation for 
affected workers and firms. Gehrke and Weber (2018) find that labor market reforms adopted 
during a recession aggravate the downturn, while they increase growth during an upswing.
Consistent with these arguments, the coefficient on the interaction term shows that the 
positive effect of monetary policy shocks on structural reforms is stronger in the periphery  
than in the core. The point estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
bottom of Table 2 shows that the lagged monetary policy shock and the interaction term  
are jointly significant as well. The joint effect is negative, implying that contractionary 
monetary policy shocks lower the reform rate in the periphery significantly. In contrast, 
monetary policy shocks have no statistically significant effect on reform efforts in the core.
Columns 2 to 4 are variations of these findings based on alternative indicators of the health 
of public finances or the state of the economy. In all three specifications, the interaction 
variable and the joint effect of the shock and the interaction term are statistically signifi-
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cant. Moreover, all effects have the expected negative sign. The reform responsiveness to 
monetary policy shocks is stronger in countries under a financial assistance program, with 
higher unemployment rates or with more elevated government debt levels. The findings are 
in line with Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) and Abiad and Mody (2005) who argue that 
countries with little fiscal flexibility or suffering from banking crises adopt systematically 
fewer reforms.
Columns 5 to 7 test the flip side of the argument. They assess whether monetary policy  
has weaker effects on reform responsiveness in countries with more fiscal space3, higher 
output gaps or higher inflation. First, we find that such countries are, per se, more prone 
to engage in reforms. At the same time, they respond significantly less to monetary policy 
shocks. For example, more fiscal space implies systematically more reforms, but less  
sensitivity of the reform rate to monetary policy shocks. 
4.3  Country differences
We now add a full set of country dummies to the model and interact one of them at a  
time with the monetary policy shocks to further disentangle regional differences in how 
monetary surprises affect reform activity. Table 3 on the next page shows the results for 
those euro area countries for which data on the reform responsiveness rate are available. 
3 The number of observations drops due to some missing values for potential output which enters the  
calculation of fiscal space.
TABLE 2: Transmission channels of monetary policy shocks to reform activity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: change in reform responsiveness rate
Interaction 
variable Periphery Program
Unem-
ployment
Gov.  
debt
Fiscal  
space
Output  
gap Inflation
Monetary 
shock, t
 – 0.51 ***  – 0.38 ***  – 0.50 ***  – 0.32 *  – 0.42 ***  – 0.31 **  – 0.43 ***
 (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.12)
Monetary 
shock, t-1
 – 0.10  – 0.31 *  0.27  0.35  – 0.21  – 0.11  – 0.80 ***
 (0.20)  (0.17)  (0.31)  (0.23)  (0.17)  (0.27)  (0.21)
Interaction 
variable, t-1
 – 0.12 *  – 0.30 ***  – 0.02 ***  2.53 ***  0.02 ***  – 0.00 ***  0.04 **
 (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.01)  (0.97)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.02)
Interaction 
term, t-1
 – 0.82 ***  – 2.02 ***  – 0.09 ***  23.19 ***  0.15 ***  – 0.01  0.28 **
 (0.27)  (0.43)  (0.03)  (7.06)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.11)
Control 
variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Observations  136  136  136  136  95  136  136
Chi2 of 
regression  311.58  383.13  737.71  304.07  170.34  699.25  475.40
p-value joint 
test  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.015  0.005  0.000  0.001
Notes: FGLS with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1. A reform is an increase in 
the dependent variable. All models contain country fixed effects and contemporaneous and lagged values of the crisis dummy, 
output gap and structural balance. Sample period: 2006-2016, yearly observations. Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.1, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The bottom of the table shows the number of observations, the chi-squared statistic of the regression 
and the p-value of a test for joint significance of the monetary policy shock in t-1 and the interaction term between the 
monetary policy shock in t-1 and the interaction variable in t-1. The interaction variable is indicated at the top of the column.
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The top panel contains the results for the core countries. The point estimates for the  
country dummies, albeit often not significant, tend to be positive, suggesting that these 
countries adopt on average more of the recommended reforms than the periphery. An 
exception is Finland, which experienced several years of negative growth during the  
sample period. More interestingly, the coefficients of the interaction terms are all positive 
and highly significant at the 1 percent level jointly with the monetary policy shock, except 
for Austria and Finland. For Belgium, Germany, France and Luxembourg, the interaction 
term dominates the joint effect, such that the overall effect of the monetary policy shocks is 
positive. This result indicates that surprise monetary easing induces a reform slowdown in 
these core countries.
The bottom of Table 3 displays the results for the periphery countries. It shows the  
mirror image of the results for the core countries. Nearly all country dummies have  
a negative sign, although only two are significant, suggesting the periphery countries  
TABLE 3: Country– specific effects of monetary policy shocks on structural reforms
Dependent variable: change in reform responsiveness rate
Core countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country AUT BEL DEU FIN FRA LUX NLD
Monetary policy shock, t  – 0.32 ***  – 0.33 ***  – 0.32 ***  – 0.25 ***  – 0.33 ***  – 0.33 ***  – 0.32 ***
 (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)
Monetary policy shock, t– 1  – 0.44 ***  – 0.49 ***  – 0.48 ***  – 0.23  – 0.50 ***  – 0.47 ***  – 0.46 ***
 (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)
Country  0.01  0.20 ***  0.13  – 0.18 ***  0.16 *  0.04  0.02
 (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)
Country × Monetary policy 
shock, t– 1
 – 0.02  1.42 ***  1.17 **  – 0.73 ***  0.92 **  0.52  0.25
 (0.48)  (0.38)  (0.54)  (0.27)  (0.44)  (0.43)  (0.45)
Observations  136  136  136  136  136  136  136
Chi2 of regression  382.52  487.00  447.15  359.25  477.79  401.43  395.06
p– value of joint test for MPt– 1 
and Country  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Periphery countries (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Country ESP GRC IRL ITA PRT SVK SVN
Monetary policy shock, t  – 0.31 ***  – 0.30 ***  – 0.31 ***  – 0.32 ***  – 0.30 ***  – 0.35 ***  – 0.33 ***
 (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)
Monetary policy shock, t– 1  – 0.42 ***  – 0.30 **  – 0.41 ***  – 0.45 ***  – 0.40 ***  – 0.52 ***  – 0.42 ***
 (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)
Country  – 0.11  – 0.29 ***  – 0.13  – 0.01  – 0.12  0.01  – 0.23 ***
 (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.08)
Country × Monetary policy 
shock, t– 1
 – 0.70  – 1.80 ***  – 0.71  0.17  – 0.70  0.55  – 1.78 ***
 (0.62)  (0.58)  (0.65)  (0.66)  (0.53)  (0.39)  (0.65)
Observations  136  136  136  136  136  136  136
Chi2 of regression  390.30  271.29  358.04  387.37  387.73  415.06  408.85
p– value of joint test for MPt– 1 
and Country  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Notes: FGLS with standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1. A reform is an 
increase in the dependent variable. Sample period: 2006– 2016, yearly observations. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The bottom 
of the table shows the number of observations, the chi– squared statistic of the regression and the p–value of a test for joint 
significance of the monetary policy shock in t–1 and the interaction term between the monetary policy shock in t–1 and a country 
dummy. All regressions include a constant and a lagged crisis dummy.
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adopt systematically fewer reforms than core countries. The interaction terms have a  
negative sign, except for Italy and the Slovak Republic. They are also highly statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level jointly with the monetary policy shock, as the p-values  
at the very bottom of the table shows. This joint test suggests that monetary easing mostly 
spurs reform efforts in the periphery. It should be noted, however, that the interaction 
terms – although indicating the correct sign – are statistically significant only for two of 
the periphery countries. The joint significance does not entirely rule out the possibility that 
statistical significance of this test stems from the main effect only. Yet taking together 
the joint significance, the sign of the coefficients and the statistically significant interac-
tion term for periphery countries in Column 1 of Table 1 suggests that the monetary pol-
icy shock exhibits a stronger effect in periphery countries. Moreover, Table 3 indicates that 
the reform-inducing effect of unexpected monetary accommodation is particularly strong 
in Greece and Slovenia, but also sizeable in Spain, Ireland and Portugal over the period of 
investigation.
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5 Robustness analysis
5.1 Cleaned monetary policy shocks
In this section, we assess the robustness of the results. First, we investigate the proper-
ties of the monetary policy shocks. As mentioned earlier, the shocks are not exactly mean-
zero and show some persistence. Therefore, we now test whether they are predictable. If 
they are, we clean them and test whether our main results remain unchanged. As the mov-
ing-averaging type weighting scheme of Gertler and Karadi (2015) mechanically intro-
duces some autocorrelation into our annual shock measure (Ramey, 2016), we focus on the 
unweighted shocks. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 9 in the appendix regress them on the previous 
year’s output gap, inflation and unemployment rate, one at a time. None of the variables 
predicts the shocks and the fit of the models is low. In a final speci fication, we regress the 
shocks on all three variables jointly. The coefficient for inflation is borderline significant.
Therefore, in a next step, we use the residual of that regression as an alternative measure  
of monetary shocks and test whether it affects structural reforms. Columns 1 to 3 of 
Table 10 in the appendix show that the residual from the reaction function regression has  
a statistically significant effect on reforms when correcting for alternative reform drivers.  
The point estimates drop slightly in absolute size relative to the baseline estimates, but 
they remain signi fi cant.
In Columns 4 to 6, we employ a more technical way of cleaning the shocks. We first run an 
AR(1) model for the shocks and then use the residuals. The point estimates drop further in 
absolute size as the persistence of the shock measure drops, which reduces the monetary 
impetus, but the effects remain significant at least at the 5 percent level.
5.2 Alternative estimators
The last part of the sensitivity analysis consists of the use of alternative (panel) estimators  
for the baseline model. The results are summarized in Table 11 in the appendix. Columns 1 
and 2 use feasible generalized least squares with alternative assumptions about the error  
structure. Column 1 shows the baseline specification for comparison, which assumes het-
eroskedastic and first-order autocorrelated errors. Column 2 instead assumes independence 
over time. Column 3 uses OLS with robust standard errors, Column 4 OLS with bootstrap 
standard errors to account for generated regressors using 1000 replications. Column 5  
is based on the random effects model and Columns 6 and 7 use panel-corrected standard  
errors, either without or with first-order autocorrelation in the error terms. Across Col-
umns 2 to 7, 9 out of the 14 point estimates for the monetary policy shocks are statistically 
significant. Moreover, the point estimates show the expected negative sign and are of  
relatively stable size across estimators. 
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6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of monetary policy shocks on structural reform  
adoption. First, we extract the unexpected variation in euro area interest rates around  
ECB announcements using an event study approach. Then we estimate the effect of the 
monetary shocks on the reform responsiveness rate. This indicator measures the imple-
mented reforms in percent of reforms recommended by the OECD and is a comprehensive 
monitor of governments’ reform action.
Our findings suggest that an expansionary monetary policy shock increases reform efforts 
significantly in the euro area. This result is robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis.  
Our results further show that expansionary monetary surprises have stronger reform- 
inducing effects during dire economic times and in the euro area periphery than in 
Europe’s prosperous core countries with ample fiscal space. This pattern is consistent  
with the room-for-maneuver hypothesis, which contends that monetary easing allows  
crisis-hit countries to embark on adopting reforms for which they might otherwise not 
have been able to cover the direct financial or political and social costs. This result might  
be more important than ever in face of the current corona crisis.
All in all, our results suggest that expansionary monetary policy has macroeconomic  
effects beyond the direct short-term stabilization of aggregate demand. It creates the 
breathing space necessary for reforms, which let economies grow faster and more stable  
in the long-term. This effect of monetary policy adds to the understanding of both the 
drivers of structural reforms and of the side effects of monetary policy. Furthermore,  
it allows for designing an adequate policy mix containing both demand-side and supply- 
side actions after deep recessions and during prolonged periods of low growth. The unprec-
edented economic shock from the corona virus as well as the recent judgement of the  
German Federal Constitutional Court on the ECB’s policy have added new importance to  
the debate. Further research will be needed to establish to what extent the results will be 
applicable in a post-corona economic and institutional environment of the euro area.
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Appendix
TABLE 4: Evolution of Going for Growth priorities by policy area
The share of Going for Growth priorities by area (in %) 2007 2011 2013 2015 2017
Labor productivity
Human capital 14 15 16 16 17
R&D and innovation policies 2 2 4 6 7
Product market regulation, trade and FDI 24 25 21 22 19
Agriculture and energy subsidies 5 4 4 4 3
Tax system-structure and efficiency 3 5 5 5 9
Efficiency of public spending 5 5 5 4 5
– General efficiency 3 3 3 2 3
– Efficiency of the healthcare sector 2 2 2 2 1
Public infrastructure 2 2 2 2 4
Legal infrastructure and the rule of law 2 1 1 1 1
Financial markets regulation 1 1 1 0 0
Housing / planning policies/barriers to labor mobility 1 1 1 1 2
Total productivity 58 62 60 61 66
Labor utilization
Tax system – emphasis on the level of labor tax wedges 9 8 7 7 5
Social benefits and active labor market policies (ALMPs) 15 14 17 17 17
– UB / social protection and ALMPs 4 5 9 10 15
– Retirement and disability schemes 11 9 7 6 2
– Retirement systems 6 6 4 4 1
– Disability and sickness schemes 5 3 3 2 1
Policy barriers to full-time female participation 5 3 5 5 6
Labor market regulation and collective wage agreements 11 11 10 9 5
– Job protection legislation 6 8 7 6 3
– Minimum wages and wage bargaining systems 5 3 2 3 1
Housing / planning policies / barriers to labor mobility 3 2 2 2 2
Total labor utilization 42 38 40 39 34
Total number of priorities 155 175 175 175 175
Source: OECD (2015), OECD (2017).
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TABLE 6: ECB announcements, 2000 – 2016
Date Date of Council Meeting / Policy Announcement
Conventional Monetary Policy: Council Meetings
2000 – 2007 2000: 05.01., 20.01., 03.02., 17.02., 02.03., 16.03., 30.03., 13.04., 27.04., 11.05., 25.05., 08.06., 21.06., 06.07., 20.07., 03.08., 31.08., 14.09., 
05.10., 19.10., 02.11., 16.11., 30.11., 14.12. 
2001: 04.01., 18.01., 01.02., 15.02., 01.03., 15.03., 29.03., 11.04., 26.04., 10.05., 23.05., 07.06., 21.06., 05.07., 19.07., 02.08., 30.08., 13.09., 
17.09., 27.09., 11.10., 25.10., 08.11., 06.12. 
2002: 03.01., 07.02., 07.03., 04.04., 02.05., 06.06., 04.07., 01.08., 12.09., 10.10., 07.11., 05.12. 
2003: 09.01., 06.02., 06.03., 03.04., 08.05., 05.06., 10.07., 31.07., 04.09., 02.10., 06.11., 04.12. 
2004: 08.01., 05.02., 04.03., 01.04., 06.05., 03.06., 01.07., 05.08., 02.09., 07.10., 04.11., 02.12. 
2005: 13.01., 03.02., 03.03., 07.04., 04.05., 02.06., 07.07., 04.08., 01.09., 06.10., 03.11., 01.12. 
2006: 12.01., 02.02., 02.03., 06.04., 04.05., 08.06., 06.07., 03.08., 31.08., 05.10., 02.11., 07.12. 
2007: 11.01., 08.02., 08.03., 12.04., 10.05., 06.06., 05.07.
Unconventional Monetary Policy: Policy Announcements
22.08.2007 Supplementary liquidity-providing Longer-term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) with a maturity 3M
28.03.2008 LTROs with a maturity of six months
29.09.2008 Special term refinancing operation
08.10.2008 Fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment on the main refinancing operations (MROs)
15.10.2008 List of assets eligible as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations extended
07.05.2009 LTROs with a maturity of one year
04.06.2009 Details on Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP)
03.12.2009 Phasing out of six-month LTROs, indexation of new one year LTROs
04.03.2010 Phasing out of three-month LTROs, indexation of six month LTROs
10.05.2010 Securities Markets Program (SMP)
28.07.2010 Risk control measures in collateral framework reviewed
03.03.2011 Further LTROs
09.06.2011 MROs as Fixed-rate Tender Procedures with full Allotment (FRFA) for at least until October 2011
04.08.2011 Further LTROs with a maturity of three and six months
08.08.2011 ECB will actively implement its SMP
06.10.2011 New Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP2)
08.12.2011 Two additional LTROs with a maturity of three years
21.12.2011 Results of first three-year LTRO
09.02.2012 ECB‘s Governing Council approves eligibility criteria for additional credit claims
28.02.2012 Results of second three-year LTRO
Continued next  page
TABLE 5: Summary statistics of structural reform indicators and monetary policy shocks
Observations Mean S. D. Minimum Maximum
OECD Reform Responsiveness Rate 152 0.329 0.185 0 0.917
Monetary policy shocks 323 – 0.058 0.141 – 0.298 0.248
Notes: Sample for structural reforms: 2006–2016. Sample period for monetary policy shocks: 2000 – 2016,  
2008 – 2016 for unconventional monetary policy shocks.
Sources: OECD; Bloomberg, yearly observations.
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06.06.2012 FRFA on MROs as long as necessary, at least until January 2013
26.07.2012 “Whatever-it-takes” speech by ECB President Mario Draghi in London
02.08.2012 Outright Monetary Transactions Program (OMT)
06.09.2012 Technical features of OMT
06.12.2012 FRFA on MROs as long as necessary, at least until July 2013
22.03.2013 Collateral rule changes for some uncovered government guaranteed bank bonds
02.05.2013 FRFA on MROs as long as necessary, at least until July 2014
04.07.2013 Governing Council expects interest rates at present or lower levels (open-ended forward guidance)
08.11.2013 FRFA on MROs as long as necessary, at least until July 2015 
05.06.2014 Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs)
03.07.2014 Details on TLTROs published, deposit rate -0.1
04.09.2014 Deposit rate -0.2
22.01.2015 Announcement of Expanded Asset Purchase Program (EAPP)
16.07.2015 Reaffirmation that purchases are intended to run until end of September 2016
31.08.2015 New category of assets added as eligible collateral
03.09.2015 Increase in Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) issue share limit
23.09.2015 Eurosystem adjust purchase process in ABSPP
22.10.2015 Questions on requirements for EAPP extension answered
09.11.2015 Increase in PSPP issue share limit enlarges purchasable universe
03.12.2015 EAPP extended until March 2017, deposit rate -0.3
21.01.2016 Review and possibly reconsider monetary policy stance at next meeting
10.03.2016 Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations II (TLTRO II), EAPP expanded, corporate bonds added to EAPP, deposit rate -0.4
21.04.2016 Details on implementation of EAPP expansion
03.05.2016 Legal acts relating to TLTRO II is published
02.06.2016 Details on Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP) published
21.07.2016 Confirmation that EAPP at 80 billion per month to run at least until March 2017
08.09.2016 Council meeting confirming continuation of EAPP
05.10.2016 Changes to collateral eligibility criteria and risk control measures for unsecured bank bonds
20.10.2016 Council meeting confirming continuation of EAPP
Source: Own compilation.
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TABLE 7: Description of the variables
Variable Description
OECD Reform 
Responsiveness Rate (RRR)
Assesses reform actions taken in OECD Going for Growth policy priorities. Based on a scoring system in which 
recommendations set in the previous Going for Growth issue take a value of one if “significant” action is taken, and 
zero otherwise. An action is considered as significant if the associated reform addresses the underlying policy 
recommendation and if it is actually legislated. Takes on values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating more 
reforms. Data are manually extracted from the Going for Growth 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2017 issues. Data available 
for all euro area countries, except for Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta: 2006–2016; for Estonia: 2014–2016, for Latvia: 2016, 
for Slovenia: 2012–2016. Values for 2007, 2013 and 2015 were interpolated. Source: OECD.
Monetary policy shocks Measure of the unexpected variation in euro area interest rates on ECB policy announcement days for conventional 
and unconventional announcements. For conventional monetary policy (January 2000 up to July 2007), the common 
unexpected change in the next-to-maturity futures rate, in the second futures rate and in the fifth futures rate of the 
three-month Euribor is extracted. For unconventional monetary policy (August 2007 up to December 2016), sovereign 
bond yields with a maturity of 2, 5 and 10 years are used for all euro area countries, except for Cyprus, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg (no data available). No distinction between different types of unconventional policies. Weighted 
observations à la Gertler and Karadi (2015), with stronger weights for observations taking place earlier in the year. Data 
available for all euro area countries, 2000–2016. Source: Bloomberg, Datastream.
Macroeconomic Variables
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)
Measure of the value added created through the production of goods and services. Real gross domestic product, volume, 
market prices in euro, 2010. Data available for all euro area countries, 2000-2016. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
database, IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2017) for Cyprus, Malta.
Consumer Price Index (CPI) Measure of changes in the prices of goods and services purchased or otherwise acquired by households to satisfy their 
own needs and wants. Inflation, average consumer prices, index. Base year: 2015 for all euro area countries, except for 
Austria (2005), Greece (2005), Slovenia (2005), Spain (2016). Data available for all euro area countries, 2000–2016. 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2017).
Unemployment rate Number of unemployed people in percent of total labor force. Data available for all euro area countries, 2000–2016. 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2017).
Economic (Control) Variables
Crisis dummy Dummy variable equal to one if country is hit by a banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis in a given year. Data available 
for all euro area countries, 2000–2016. Source: Valencia and Laeven (2012), Medas et al. (2018).
Output gap Measure of the difference between GDP and potential GDP as percentage of potential GDP. Data available for all euro 
area countries, except for Lithuania, 2000–2016. Source: OECD Economic Outlook database, IMF World Economic Outlook 
database (April 2017) for Cyprus, Malta.
Structural balance Measure of general government structural balance in percent of potential GDP. Data available for all euro area countries, 
2000-2016 (for Latvia: 2003–2016, Lithuania: 2005–2016). Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2017).
Government debt Measure of general government gross debt in percent of GDP. Data available for all euro area countries, 2000–2016. 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2017).
Program dummy Dummy variable equal to one if country received financial assistance from the IMF or ESM in a given year. Program 
countries are Cyprus (2013-2016), Estonia (2000–2001), Greece (2010–2016), Ireland (2010-2013), Latvia (2000–2002, 
2008–2011), Lithuania (2000-2003), Portugal (2011–2014) and Spain (2012–2013). Data available for all program 
countries, 2000–2016. Source: IMF and ESM website.
Fiscal Space Measure of the budgetary room that allows a government to provide resources for public purposes without undermining 
fiscal sustainability. Own calculations: (g-r)D/Y, where g is the potential real GDP growth rate, r is the real interest rate 
on 10-year sovereign bonds, D equals net public debt and Y is nominal GDP. Data available for Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 2000–2016 (for Austria: 2011–2016). Source: OECD 
Economic Outlook database, Duval (2008).
Periphery dummy Dummy variable equal to one if country is categorized as periphery country. Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Spain are periphery countries. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are considered core countries.
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TABLE 10: Impact of cleaned monetary policy shocks on reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: change in reform responsiveness rate
Cleaned monetary shocks
Forecasting residual, t  – 0.24 ***  – 0.26 ***  – 0.28 ***
 (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)
Forecasting residual, t – 1  – 0.28 ***  – 0.30 ***  – 0.33 ***
 (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)
Residual AR(1), t  – 0.16 **  – 0.19 **  – 0.28 ***
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.10)
Residual AR(1), t – 1  – 0.17 **  – 0.20 **  – 0.31 ***
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.10)
Control variables
Crisis dummy, t and t – 1  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Output gap, t and t – 1  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Struct. balance, t and t – 1  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Program dummy, t and t – 1  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Unemployment, t and t – 1  Yes  Yes
Observations  136  136  136  136  136  136
Chi2 of regression  362.91  317.98  674.32  511.15  460.40  388.33
Notes: FGLS with standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1. All models contain unreported 
country dummies. A reform is an increase in the indicator. Sample period: 2006– 2016, yearly observations. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
TABLE 9: Predictive regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: monetary policy shock, t
Output gap, t-1  0.003  (0.002)  – 0.002  (0.005)
Inflation, t-1  0.009  (0.007)  0.013 * (0.007)
Unemployment, t-1  – 0.355   (0.253)  – 0.345  (0.574)
Observations  304  304  323  288
R2  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03
Notes: Fixed effects regression with clustered standard errors (in parentheses). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
TABLE 8: Macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks in the euro area
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ∆log (GDP) ∆log (CPI) ∆unemployment
Monetary shock, t  – 0.025 ** (0.012)  – 0.011 * (0.006)  0.011 *** (0.004)
Monetary shock, t-1  0.008  (0.011)  0.005  (0.006)  0.008 ** (0.004)
Observations  304  304  304
FGLS with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of order 1. Dependent variables are indicated below 
the column numbers, control variables consist of a crisis dummy in t and t-1. Sample period 2000-2016, yearly observations. Standard 
errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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TABLE 11: Alternative estimators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: change in reform responsiveness rate
Baseline: 
FGLS with 
heterosk. 
AR(1)
FGLS with 
heterosk. 
AR(0)
OLS,
robust
s.e.
OLS
bootstrap
s.e.
Random
effects
PCSE
i.i.d.
errors
PCSE
AR(1)
errors
Monetary shock, t  – 0.31 ***  – 0.24 *  – 0.24 **  – 0.28 *  – 0.24 ***  – 0.25 ***  – 0.31 ***
 (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.10)
Monetary shock, t-1  – 0.28 **  – 0.22  – 0.22  – 0.28  – 0.22 ***  – 0.19 **  – 0.28 **
 (0.14)  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.20)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.14)
Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes
Observations  136  136  136  136  136  136  136
Chi2  378.99  554.15  14.53  8835.24  1905.55
R2  0.16  0.16  0.09  0.16  0.15
Notes: All models contain an unreported intercept and as controls one lag of the output gap, the structural balance, a crisis dummy,  
a program dummy and the unemployment rate. A reform is an increase in the indicator. Sample period: 2006–2016, yearly observations. 
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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